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understandings and favor pro-growth projects that 
privilege the interest of urban elites over equitable 
infrastructure and service distribution.  Drawing on 
the concepts of ‘exchange value’ and ‘use value’, we 
examine the need for a new way of conceptualizing the 
impacts of infrastructure projects. While not attempting to 
design a formal mechanism for evaluating use value, the 
authors examine the need for incorporating use value and 
opportunity cost into the planning process.   
This article starts by examining the growth mandate 
that stems from neoliberal planning policy and highlights 
the subsequent infrastructural inequity resulting from 
pro-growth planning regimes.  After considering the 
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Introduction
Neoliberal notions of hyper-privatized land use 
and limit-less economic growth have divided the city 
into small patches of private development, complete 
with fragmented infrastructure and disconnected land 
use that increase sociospatial inequalities.  Under the 
auspices of privatized market logic, infrastructure and 
service distribution become clustered in areas codifi ed 
for economic growth by pro-growth interests.  Often 
neglected in this process are economically marginalized 
communities, where diminishing services are in greatest 
need of redevelopment.  The neoliberal infrastructure 
planning process is problematic, as economic growth 
is the primary project goal, relegating the spatial 
distribution and functionality of service delivery to 
a secondary planning concern.  In an effort to ensure 
equitable and functional planning, the criteria used to 
evaluate the impacts of infrastructure and services must 
be critiqued. 
Most infrastructure projects are evaluated through 
the lens of economic growth and justifi ed through the 
analytics of value capture and economic multipliers, 
which focus on generating revenue and return on 
investment.  These project metrics reinforce neoliberal 
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2008; Ward, 2007; Bohl, 2000).  These special districts 
are often fi nanced by public funding and private business 
donations organized though local booster organizations 
(Ward, 2006).   
The fi nancing for these districts typically comes from 
public funds, however the tax revenues in special districts 
often must be invested back into the district (Ward, 2011). 
This spatially constrained re-investment creates a closed-
system, whereby any return on the initial public investment 
is legally prohibited from being spent on infrastructure 
and services outside the boundaries of the special district. 
The re-investment into the district is designed to attract 
new development and investment, creating a cyclical fl ow 
of money.  These geographically delineated districts are 
prescribed to encourage so called ‘creative’ growth as 
a means of supporting the competitive city approach to 
urban governance (Florida, 2005; 2004).  This approach 
attempts to draw ‘creative’ young professionals to a 
region with many cultural amenities, creating the young, 
educated labor pool that relocation corporations and start-
up companies desire.  The planning convention is that 
establishing special entertainment districts will foster 
the cultural and diversity prerequisites for establishing a 
creative city.  Critiques of creative growth question the 
process of special commercial districts, noting that it 
creates enclaves of gentrifi cation that are unsustainable 
without public funding (Peck, 2011; Boudreau, 2009). 
They also highlight the inequality in public funding for 
special districts, as adjacent low-income neighborhoods 
are often priced out of their homes as property values rise 
(ibid). 
In similar 
closed-fee systems, 
such as special district 
fi nancing, municipal 
enterprise funds 
and special levies, 
revenue is generated 
by infrastructure 
and service impact 
fees which are often 
constrained.  These 
special districts 
include public 
fi nanced business 
i m p r o v e m e n t 
districts (BIDs), 
tax incremental 
fi nancing (TIFs) and special assessment improvement 
districts (SAIDs).  Constrained revenues are required to be 
reinvested back into the original mode of infrastructure. 
Many municipalities and other governing jurisdictions 
have expenditure limitations, preventing the reallocation 
of funds from one infrastructural mode, such as water 
systems, to fund another infrastructure mode, such as 
local road systems.  Beyond local statutes, expenditure 
limitations are reinforced through judicial decisions, such 
current role of urban and regional planners, we focus on 
the disparity between exchange value planning and use 
value planning.  To illustrate the material disparity of 
service delivery brought about by privileging economic 
development over use value, a study of urban transit 
oriented development will be presented as an example.  We 
will end with a look at how use value can be incorporated 
into the project review and decision making process.  
Pro-Growth Planning Regimes in the Competitive 
City 
The increasingly privatized nature of cities and 
their urban infrastructure empower a coalition of elected 
offi cials, local businesses and extra-urban corporate 
investors.  These local elites have vested interests in 
increased property values and the power to prescribe 
planning regimes that prioritize economic growth in 
specifi c areas of the city (Cochrane, 1998; Stone, 1989; 
Logan and Molotch, 1987).  Local elites frame urban 
infrastructure as a means to encourage growth by attracting 
new investment in the region.  Neoliberal logic expects this 
growth to bring desirable jobs and increase tax revenues for 
the city.  Urban and regional planners, situated within the 
neoliberal political structure, are subject to the pressures 
of pro-growth mandates (Fainstien, 2010; Walters, 2010). 
Charged with planning public urban infrastructure that 
privileges the economic development goals of developers, 
local and regional planners are expected to design urban 
infrastructure to boost property value, regardless of 
the subsequent sociospatial inequalities (Gandy, 2002; 
Wakeford, 1990; 
Stone, 1989).   
The competitive 
city, the moniker 
given for a city’s 
effort to ‘out-
compete’ comparable 
cities for capital 
investment, also 
prescribes a pro-
growth planning 
regime focused on 
redeveloping the built 
environment with 
new infrastructure 
to attract investment 
(Kipfer and Keil, 
2002).  Following the principles of Richard Florida’s 
(2005; 2004) creative city approach, the competitive city 
model relies on state of the art infrastructure and urban 
amenities to entice young professionals and establish 
an educated labor pool for relocating companies. 
Public-private partnerships are established to cultivate 
these amenities through projects such as downtown 
revitalization programs, entertainment districts and 
business improvement districts (MacLeod, 2011; Cook, 
The allocation of funds with rigid 
constraints on distribution creates 
an inherently inequitable system that 
ensures investment returns to small 
urban districts or within specifi c 
infrastructure modes, as state and 
federal regulations often constrain the 
means by which urban infrastructure 
can be funded
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of public planning, as more and more infrastructure 
projects are done on a project-by-project basis by private 
developers.  A multitude of private projects without 
coordinated efforts and governmental oversight creates a 
landscape of fragmented 
development, which 
has a large impact on 
the production of the 
sociospatial urban 
form (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002).  At 
a time when city and 
regional planners 
have fewer means of 
planning at a city-wide 
scale, the power of private entrepreneurial developers 
to shape the urban form has increased.  Neoliberal pro-
growth planning regimes, which feature privatized and 
proprietary infrastructure, lie in sharp contrast to the 
provenience planning and infrastructural standardization 
practices employed by managerial state planners (Schmidt 
& Buehler, 2007).   
The pressure on urban and regional planners to 
feed growth machine politics in the neoliberal city can 
be summed up in a speech by John Friedman, “Speaking 
as an American, I would say that offi cial planning in 
my country is largely a farce. What counts with us is 
the politics of city-building, and that is not quite the 
same” (1998; authors’ emphasis).  The politics of city 
building are the politics of economic development and 
pro-growth coalitions.  Planners are preciously situated 
between planning for the public good and meeting the 
pro-growth demands of local elites.  This tension arises 
out of historical contradictions between the role of the 
progressive provenience planner of the mid-20th century 
and current expectations for a market oriented neoliberal 
planner (Orueta and Fainstien, 2009).  Mirroring the 
state of neoclassical economics, the era of progressive 
social welfare planning can be viewed as a short post-
Depression period situated between two periods of hyper-
privatization.   
By creating a competitive business environment 
established through private development projects, the 
power of public planners to design an integrated urban 
form has been eroded.  Kipfer and Keil (2002) speak to the 
role of planners in the neoliberal city, noting “city planners 
have little control over investment and thus see their role 
restricted to managing the contradictions of capitalist 
urbanization and codifying real estate trends through 
the politics of development approvals. The increasing 
fl exibility of planning practice has certainly accentuated 
the constraints and limitations of city planning” (pg 228). 
This bleak framing of contemporary planning highlights 
the lack of infl uence planners have on designing the urban 
built environment.  Planners as ‘city-builders’ are situated 
as caretakers charged with ensuring pro-growth zoning 
codes and liberally approving development projects on 
as the Nollan and Dolan case on exactions limitations. 
The court’s ruling in this case limits the process by which 
funds can be reallocated to offset other development 
externalities associated with urban growth (Saxer, 2000). 
Similarly, this ‘means-
end’ requirement creates 
a legal limitation for 
municipal governments. 
These limitations restrict 
the distribution of 
special district revenues 
that could address a 
wider set of indirect 
externalities, offsetting 
issues associated with 
rapid development including diminished affordable 
housing and congested transportation systems (Glaesner 
and Gottlieb, 2008; Holloway and Guy, 2000). 
The allocation of funds with rigid constraints on 
distribution creates an inherently inequitable system that 
ensures investment returns to small urban districts or 
within specifi c infrastructure modes, as state and federal 
regulations often constrain the means by which urban 
infrastructure can be funded. A notable example are the 
restrictions on how fuel taxes are re-invested back into 
transportation infrastructure.  Many states have either 
constitutional or statutory requirements that mandate fuel 
taxes be spent exclusively for highway projects, at the 
expense of other transportation modes or infrastructure 
(Rall et al, 2011).  
Re-investment of general revenue usually fl ows 
toward infrastructure that meets the needs of development 
projects being courted by the city, rather than toward 
community wide infrastructure projects (Soja, 2010; 
Gotham, 2005).  This type of pro-growth model of public 
investment can serve to disenfranchise large groups 
of urban residents, by failing to distribute commercial 
tax revenue beyond the sphere of new commercial 
development.  If projects are designed to attract the most 
economic growth, then the infrastructural and service 
delivery needs for the city-at-large become a secondary 
goal.  The practice of steering investment toward new 
areas of gentrifi cation, with the greatest potential for 
economic growth (Smith & Graves, 2005; Brueckner & 
Rosenthal, 2005) is a practice that frequently displaces 
economically disadvantaged communities.
Politics of City Building 
The privatization of infrastructure design erodes the 
power of city planners to shape large sections of the urban 
built environment.  Neoliberal policies reduce public 
planning and funding for provenience infrastructure – such 
as water, sewage and other basic and essential infrastructure 
needs of the city – in favor of private infrastructure 
development and service delivery.  Graham and Marvin 
(2001) call this process ‘splintering infrastructure’, 
noting that privatization serves to weaken the power 
The privatization of infrastructure 
design erodes the power of city 
planners to shape large sections of 
the urban built environment
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tax revenue to justify the initial public investment.  The 
second proposal, a request to expand the capacity of the 
storm water system in an older residential area, is not able 
to claim there will be a monetary return on investment 
for the city.  A use value metric that could incorporate the 
importance of mitigating residential fl ood events, as an 
alternative to highlighting the net gain in exchange value 
brought by a development project, would allow space for 
planners to justify conceptions of value beyond simple 
return of investment indices.   
What underpin most of these assumptions are 
neoliberal pro-growth understandings that any economic 
growth is good growth.  Not factored into value capture 
models are considerations of use value or lost opportunity 
cost resulting from private development, as public 
agencies are often burdened with funding additional 
infrastructure projects generated by private commercial 
growth (Theodore, et. al., 2012; 
Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Weber, 
2002).  Although growth proponents 
see new commercial investment 
as a net gain for the city, the 
costs of increasing transportation 
capacity and storm water systems 
to accommodate new development 
and special districts often require 
public funding beyond the revenue 
generated by impact fees (Carruthers 
& Ulfarsson, 2003; Briffault, 
1999).   
Facing the challenges of a 
fi nite infrastructure budget and an array of public works 
projects to choose from, money used for infrastructure 
spillover from private development projects reduces 
the funding available for upgrading infrastructure in 
neighborhoods with greater need for infrastructure access. 
As was the case with our example, expending scarce 
fi nancial resources on the commercial development needs 
of the fi rst project often means little funding remains to 
improve the residential storm water system requested 
in the second project.  These scenarios become moral 
questions when infrastructure planning is viewed from the 
lens of use value, rather than relying on exchange value. 
Socially-just planning should prioritize the delivery of 
critical infrastructure and services to socioeconomically 
marginalized communities, over publically funded 
amenity infrastructure to facilitate the needs of private 
commercial development.  If equitable service delivery 
is not the goal of publicly funded infrastructure projects, 
than the process of urban and regional planning needs to 
be reconsidered.  
Transit Oriented Development as an Example of 
Exchange Value
Further exploring situations that privilege 
economic growth over the everyday functionality of 
urban infrastructure, we provide an extended example 
private property in an effort to stabilize and grow property 
values for local elites. 
 
Beyond City Building: A Case for Use Value 
The question then becomes, how can planners 
contest the growth-at-all-cost approach to infrastructure 
planning?  Planning practice cannot simply be neutral in 
its politics, as planning either serves to reproduce existing 
social conditions and normative understandings or to 
contest current hegemony (Harvey, 1984; Peet, 1977). 
While it is easy to create a binary of neoliberal planning, 
where planners either work to meet pro-growth demands 
or contest the foundation of neoliberal logics, the reality 
of contemporary planners is much more complex. 
Planners committed to social justice are still constrained 
by pro-growth policies and fragmented neoliberal urban 
forms, requiring planners to balance incremental policy 
changes with broader attempts at 
paradigm shifts.  Both approaches 
are necessary to secure more equity 
in the urban form and to contest 
infrastructure disenfranchisement. 
For the remainder of this article, 
we will speak to the possibilities 
for urban equity that stem from 
incremental policy changes and 
everyday practice that can serve as 
the foundation for infrastructural 
equity. 
Infrastructure designed for 
the primary goal of economic 
development can overlook, or outright ignore, issues of 
service delivery and spatial distribution.  Disenfranchised 
residents in marginalized areas of the city are more 
likely to be denied service delivery as a result of the 
institutionalization of pro-growth planning practices 
(Horner 2004, Smith, 2002).  Inherently, the problem is 
the pro-growth planning process itself, as decisions are 
based on exchange values with no mechanism by which 
to formally consider use value.  Exchange value is the 
monetary market value or economic impact of a project, 
such as increased property values and tax revenues (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987).  Use value is the functional impact of 
everyday usages and material processes that occur within 
a space (ibid).  In the case of infrastructure, use value is 
the actual service delivery provided by the infrastructure. 
The predominance of exchange value can be seen 
in the use of economic impact indicators (Campbell et 
al, 2000).  Value capture tools codify assumptions about 
changes in land use and their subsequent economic 
impact, such as the potential for generating new tax 
revenue through commercial development.  For example, 
a city allocating infrastructure funding might compare 
two proposed public works infrastructure projects.  The 
fi rst project, extending water and sewage services to a 
newly developing commercial district, would be able to 
point to economic growth and the estimated increases in 
Infrastructure designed 
for the primary goal of 
economic development 
can overlook, or outright 
ignore, issues of service 
delivery and spatial 
distribution.  
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of prioritizing exchange value over use value.  In this 
case, we examine urban transit projects which are often 
designed around economic development more than the 
act of moving people through the city.  Transit-oriented-
development (TOD) increases property value around 
transit stations, offering gains in exchange value.  Transit 
systems planners can fail to account for use value, as the 
practical needs of current transit riders are often obscured 
in the planning narrative.  These types of transportation 
projects can negatively impact transit dependent 
residents and serve to further isolate socioeconomically 
marginalized communities.   
As rail transit systems become a popular means for 
fostering redevelopment along urban corridors, more 
transportation planners and urban policymakers are 
considering light rail, streetcar and commuter rail systems. 
Fixed rail transit is conceptualized as a tool for managing 
urban sprawl and stimulating economic growth, as transit 
systems establish dense urban corridors for future (re)
development projects (Federal Railroad Administration, 
2009).  Transit oriented development reshapes the 
topology of urban property values and embeds spatial 
arrangements that reinforce the neoliberal urban form of 
the competitive city, including the fragmentation of urban 
services.   
Fitting with the competitive city logic, urban rail 
transit is framed as an amenity for young professionals 
and a mark of distinction that brings a city international 
prestige in an effort to establish a competitive advantage 
for attracting capital investment.  According to Richard 
Florida’s (2005) creative cities thesis, an idea that has 
been embraced by cities throughout North America, 
corporations are seeking to invest capital in cities with 
good transport systems and cultural amenities.  Transit 
systems help meet many of these perceived needs for 
creative growth, by establishing transportation amenities 
and gentrifi ed TOD zones around rail stations to attract 
globally mobile capital investment.   
A project goal of recently established transit systems 
is to attract ‘choice riders’, which stems from the need to 
generate a return on investment and off-set operational 
costs (Author interview).1  This neoliberal logic 
incentivizes local governments to plan transit systems 
that can establish a large middle class ridership and boost 
adjacent property value.  These middle class ‘choice 
riders’, defi ned as riders that have a choice of modes 
for daily transportation but elect to utilize public transit, 
are contrasted with riders that rely on public transit as 
their exclusive means of transportation.  Transportation 
planners are tasked with designing a system for ‘choice 
riders’ in areas with the greatest potential for economic 
growth.  By focusing on ‘choice riders’, who are also the 
target demographic for TOD projects, transit systems are 
designed to connect the wealthy power centers of the city 
(see Henderson, 2006).  The needs of transit dependent 
riders are then relegated to secondary planning concerns, 
serving to further marginalize already disenfranchised 
communities.   
The lack of transportation options for 
socioeconomically marginalized groups is well 
documented.  Access to public spaces of urban mobility is 
often established by socioeconomic status, highlighted by 
theories of spatial mismatch (Preston and McLafferty, 1999; 
Kain, 1992; 1968) and skills mismatch (Kasarda, 1985), 
which examine the limited employment opportunities 
in relationship to insuffi cient public transportation that 
isolates low income neighborhoods.  The entrapment 
theory (Hanson and Pratt, 1994; England, 1993) examines 
gendered constraints of mobility, as women are expected 
to both work and maintain the household.  However, 
simplistic conceptions of mobility and demography have 
been critiqued, noting that spatial mismatch theories fail to 
recognize the uneven geographies of power--specifi cally 
the complex relationship between space, power and 
mobility (Cresswell, 2006; Gilbert, 1998; Massey, 1993). 
Addressing these uneven topographies of power require 
special consideration by planners, to ensure equitable 
access to means of urban mobility.  
In the case of transit, it is easy to see that the exchange 
value of TOD projects becomes the concern of transit 
projects, while the use value of moving people through the 
city becomes merely a mechanism for economic growth. 
Further confusing the matter, the federal government 
justifi es funding of transit projects as a means to address 
the transportation needs of the low-come and disabled 
citizens, while simultaneously expecting more transit 
services to attract middle class suburban riders (Grengs, 
2001).  With spatial segregation of socioeconomic classes 
in the urban form, the ability to meet both of these goals 
with a single project requires a planning process that 
sets equitable access to transit for both transit dependent 
riders and discretionary choice riders as a top priority, 
rather than a secondary concern.  Public transportation 
planners must change the focus of infrastructure design 
in an effort to provide more equitable access to forms 
of urban mobility, connect more areas of the city rather 
than privileging the connectivity of elite power centers, 
and guard against the displacement of low-income 
communities in transportation redevelopment projects. 
Discussion 
While crafting a specifi c mechanism for evaluating 
use value and opportunity cost is beyond the scope of 
this piece, we would like to begin to suggest ways to 
establish new social equity metrics to evaluate use value 
and prioritize publically funded infrastructure projects. 
Creating an evaluation tool to capture use value and 
opportunity costs is a vital fi rst step to examining projects 
beyond the lens of economic growth.  By creating an 
analytic, such as a use value capture, the social cost 
and benefi ts of projects can be better evaluated for 
infrastructure equity.  One possibility is to establish 
a planning obligation similar to the NEPA Section 106 
process, which is used to evaluate the need for cultural 
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pro-growth project goals fail to consider the impacts to 
functional use value, the economic interests of local elites 
are privileged over the needs of the urban citizenry at 
large.  Neoliberal governance mandates public investment 
in pro-growth infrastructure, while failing to consider 
the social cost of not investing in equitable distribution 
of provenience infrastructure, such as transit and utility 
services, to the spaces of the city codifi ed as marginal. 
By failing to prioritize equitable access to provenance 
infrastructure for socioeconomically marginalized 
communities, planners reaffi rm the sociospatial 
hegemony of the neoliberal urban form.  City and regional 
planners must be committed to designing mechanisms for 
considering use value into the planning process, if they 
wish to move beyond their current role as city builders 
and regain their ability to (re)shape the urban form for the 
greater public good.
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